Right to sex?

Reuters Men have a right to prostitutes? Really? 23 May 2014 The male orgasm is unimaginably trivial in comparison to the human rights devastation that prostitution inflicts on whole swathes of the globe's female population, writes Caroline Norma.

A friend commented that this article reminded her of a lecture in medical school about access to sex (prostitutes for disabled patients funded by the public health system) as an important component of holistic health.

Wei Hong: When I heard the "access to sex" tutorial as a medical student, my thought was "Wow, I'm getting even less than these disabled people, I need to report to Human Rights Watch that my human rights are being violated!" :P

Right to be forgotten?

BBC News EU court backs 'right to be forgotten' in Google case 13 May 2014 A top EU court has ruled Google must amend some search results at the request of ordinary people in a test of the so-called "right to be forgotten".

The EU ruling enforcing the supposed "right to be forgotten" impinges on the "right to knowledge" and conflicts with the legal precedent that a valid total defence against a "defamation" charge is "truth."

Accountability

The Australian Catalyst statins show breached ABC code A CONTROVERSIAL television program on heart disease breached the ABC’s standards on impartiality, an internal investigation has found.

Further investigations suggest that the experts featured in the episode had ulterior commercial interests. Meanwhile, people may have died as a result of that episode. If medical practitioners give incorrect recommendations, they may be liable for severe penalties including conviction for manslaughter. I am happy for others to give health advice if they are willing to face the same penalties.

Moral absolutism

In a discussion on his wall, CYY argued that the existence of moral dilemmas (such as the “trolley problem”) indicates that “moral relativism” overrides “moral absolutism.”

WH: Given that there are an infinite number of possible moral situations, one cannot feasibly create a rulebook that dictates every course of action. Moral absolutism is the assertion that one or more principles apply regardless of situation. This need not mean rigidly applying an action to an indication (“in every situation, maximise the patient’s life”), but rather guiding one's action according to underlying principles that are nevertheless situation-independent (“in every situation, balance the patient's quantity of life with quality, autonomy, and distributive justice”).

To demonstrate, I have little trouble in answering CYY's runaway trolley challenge, for by simultaneously invoking “utilitarianism” and the “categorical imperative” as moral absolutes, I “steer the trolley to the one worker, but don't push the fat man.”

YT: Assuming the same set of moral absolutes are consistently applied, is it correct to surmise that the consistent application of the same set of principles does not necessarily lead to the same outcomes for every scenario?

WH: Yes, the same set of principles need not lead to the same outcomes for every scenario. This is true regardless of whether one is absolutist or relativist. If I invoke “always give the medicine with best probability of success,” of course the outcome will vary, because an optimal course of action can still be probabilistic.

YT: What if we eliminate probabilistic effects, and assume a deterministic system? This is obviously not possible in many real-world scenarios, so I wonder if it would be applicable to set up an artificial ideal test case.

You posed the example of “in every situation, balance the patient's quantity of life with quality, autonomy, and distributive justice” earlier. If we assume that the parameters can be quantified and the outcomes predicted with 100% accuracy, and are faced with these scenarios:

#1: Patient A's quantity of life could be increased by 90% if treatment is administered, with a 2% decrease in quality of life.

#2: Patient B's quantity of life could be increased by 2% if treatment is administered, with a 90% decrease in quality of life.

#3: Patient C's quantity of life could be increased by 2% if treatment is administered, with a 90% decrease in quality of life AND a 100% overriding of the patient's autonomy.

Is it correct to surmise that, according to the proposed principle, the optimal outcome for the three scenarios might be different?

WH: Yes, if the inputs are different, then the output will obviously be different.

YT: Alright, thanks. One last question, for now – what is your understanding of moral relativism, and how does it differ in nature from your proposed definition of moral absolutism?

WH: My definition of moral absolutism it that “there is at least one absolute moral principle.” The definition of moral relativism is that “there are no absolute moral principles.”

YT: Alright, I lied. Here's one more question. :D If we can assume quantifiable parameters and accurately predicted outcomes, and eliminate probabilistic factors, under your moral absolutist framework, is it also possible to predict the optimal outcome for each scenario? If so, how? If not, why?

WH: Moral absolutism is the idea that “there is at least one absolute principle,” not necessarily “here is the complete set of those principles.”

Nevertheless, for the sport of it, by invoking “maximise autonomy” and “maximise utility (quality-adjusted life-years)” as moral absolutes, I can answer (assuming the quality-of-life reduction applies to the entire post-treatment lifetime, not just the added lifetime) “give the treatment to patient A, but not to B or C.”

Ex nihilo

From YT’s wall:

arXiv Spontaneous creation of the universe from nothing The problem of singularity can be avoided naturally as the universe can be spontaneously created from nothing 4 April 2014

This paper does not actually describe “creation from nothing” but rather “creation from metastable false vacuum” which, by definition, is far from “nothing.” True ex nihilo creation contradicts the fundamental laws of thermodynamics.

Probabilistic utilitarianism

CY: If you have the power to kill one innocent man to save ten innocent men's lives, are you morally obliged to do it?

WH: I am using this as a prelude that as doctors we often do this - every time we start someone on warfarin, or put a 30 year old through a CT scanner.

CY: I am using this as a prelude that as doctors we often do this - every time we start someone on warfarin, or put a 30 year old through a CT scanner.

WH: I would disagree with that line of debate. I would one day like to write about my personal concept of "probabilistic utilitarianism". When we perform an intervention with risks, although it may save some and kill others, we proceed anyway if the expected value E[X] is positive. 

CY: It's different in terms of "intention" but it is the same in terms of consequentialism.

WH: Through my above argument, I would argue that there is therefore no meaningful anthropocentric distinction between deontology and utilitarianism. 

CY: If there is a magic switch in front of you where a random innocent man would die while ten random innocent men who would otherwise die would now survive. Is it morally justified to do it?
How is this different from the 10 people whom you save by CT imaging but 1 person you have now given cancer to? You don't know which 10 you are saving and which 1 who will get cancer in 30 years time. But it's still the consequence of our doing. 

WH: Under act utilitarianism or consequentialism alone, the two scenarios are the same. Under my "probabilistic utilitarianism" framework, the two scenarios are different, for only the latter is Pareto efficient.