CY: If you have the power to kill
one innocent man to save ten innocent men's lives, are you morally obliged to
do it?
WH: I am using this as a prelude that as doctors we often do this - every time we start someone on warfarin, or put a 30 year old through a CT scanner.
CY: I am using this as a prelude that as doctors we often do this - every time we start someone on warfarin, or put a 30 year old through a CT scanner.
WH: I would disagree with that line of debate. I would one day like to write about my personal concept of "probabilistic utilitarianism". When we perform an intervention with risks, although it may save some and kill others, we proceed anyway if the expected value E[X] is positive.
CY: It's different in terms of "intention" but it is the same in terms of consequentialism.
WH: Through my above argument, I would argue that there is therefore no meaningful anthropocentric distinction between deontology and utilitarianism.
CY: If there is a magic switch in front of you where a random innocent man would die while ten random innocent men who would otherwise die would now survive. Is it morally justified to do it?
How is this different from the 10 people whom you save by CT imaging but 1 person you have now given cancer to? You don't know which 10 you are saving and which 1 who will get cancer in 30 years time. But it's still the consequence of our doing.
WH: Under act utilitarianism or consequentialism alone, the two scenarios are the same. Under my "probabilistic utilitarianism" framework, the two scenarios are different, for only the latter is Pareto efficient.
WH: I am using this as a prelude that as doctors we often do this - every time we start someone on warfarin, or put a 30 year old through a CT scanner.
CY: I am using this as a prelude that as doctors we often do this - every time we start someone on warfarin, or put a 30 year old through a CT scanner.
WH: I would disagree with that line of debate. I would one day like to write about my personal concept of "probabilistic utilitarianism". When we perform an intervention with risks, although it may save some and kill others, we proceed anyway if the expected value E[X] is positive.
CY: It's different in terms of "intention" but it is the same in terms of consequentialism.
WH: Through my above argument, I would argue that there is therefore no meaningful anthropocentric distinction between deontology and utilitarianism.
CY: If there is a magic switch in front of you where a random innocent man would die while ten random innocent men who would otherwise die would now survive. Is it morally justified to do it?
How is this different from the 10 people whom you save by CT imaging but 1 person you have now given cancer to? You don't know which 10 you are saving and which 1 who will get cancer in 30 years time. But it's still the consequence of our doing.
WH: Under act utilitarianism or consequentialism alone, the two scenarios are the same. Under my "probabilistic utilitarianism" framework, the two scenarios are different, for only the latter is Pareto efficient.
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