Moral absolutism

In a discussion on his wall, CYY argued that the existence of moral dilemmas (such as the “trolley problem”) indicates that “moral relativism” overrides “moral absolutism.”

WH: Given that there are an infinite number of possible moral situations, one cannot feasibly create a rulebook that dictates every course of action. Moral absolutism is the assertion that one or more principles apply regardless of situation. This need not mean rigidly applying an action to an indication (“in every situation, maximise the patient’s life”), but rather guiding one's action according to underlying principles that are nevertheless situation-independent (“in every situation, balance the patient's quantity of life with quality, autonomy, and distributive justice”).

To demonstrate, I have little trouble in answering CYY's runaway trolley challenge, for by simultaneously invoking “utilitarianism” and the “categorical imperative” as moral absolutes, I “steer the trolley to the one worker, but don't push the fat man.”

YT: Assuming the same set of moral absolutes are consistently applied, is it correct to surmise that the consistent application of the same set of principles does not necessarily lead to the same outcomes for every scenario?

WH: Yes, the same set of principles need not lead to the same outcomes for every scenario. This is true regardless of whether one is absolutist or relativist. If I invoke “always give the medicine with best probability of success,” of course the outcome will vary, because an optimal course of action can still be probabilistic.

YT: What if we eliminate probabilistic effects, and assume a deterministic system? This is obviously not possible in many real-world scenarios, so I wonder if it would be applicable to set up an artificial ideal test case.

You posed the example of “in every situation, balance the patient's quantity of life with quality, autonomy, and distributive justice” earlier. If we assume that the parameters can be quantified and the outcomes predicted with 100% accuracy, and are faced with these scenarios:

#1: Patient A's quantity of life could be increased by 90% if treatment is administered, with a 2% decrease in quality of life.

#2: Patient B's quantity of life could be increased by 2% if treatment is administered, with a 90% decrease in quality of life.

#3: Patient C's quantity of life could be increased by 2% if treatment is administered, with a 90% decrease in quality of life AND a 100% overriding of the patient's autonomy.

Is it correct to surmise that, according to the proposed principle, the optimal outcome for the three scenarios might be different?

WH: Yes, if the inputs are different, then the output will obviously be different.

YT: Alright, thanks. One last question, for now – what is your understanding of moral relativism, and how does it differ in nature from your proposed definition of moral absolutism?

WH: My definition of moral absolutism it that “there is at least one absolute moral principle.” The definition of moral relativism is that “there are no absolute moral principles.”

YT: Alright, I lied. Here's one more question. :D If we can assume quantifiable parameters and accurately predicted outcomes, and eliminate probabilistic factors, under your moral absolutist framework, is it also possible to predict the optimal outcome for each scenario? If so, how? If not, why?

WH: Moral absolutism is the idea that “there is at least one absolute principle,” not necessarily “here is the complete set of those principles.”

Nevertheless, for the sport of it, by invoking “maximise autonomy” and “maximise utility (quality-adjusted life-years)” as moral absolutes, I can answer (assuming the quality-of-life reduction applies to the entire post-treatment lifetime, not just the added lifetime) “give the treatment to patient A, but not to B or C.”